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New York

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . . (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Statement by the Chairman

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to extend a warm welcome to the participants in the 1994 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme. I understand that as part of their programme of studies in New York, they will attend meetings of the First Committee. It is my hope that they will derive benefit from the Committee's deliberations.

Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153 (*continued*)

General debate on all disarmament and international security items

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): The first speaker on the list of speaker's for this meeting is the representative of Switzerland, on whom I now call.

Mr. Moser (Switzerland) (*interpretation from French*): I should like at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your wealth of professional experience and your tried and tested skills as a mediator are a guarantee of the success of this Committee's important work.

In order to lighten the First Committee's workload, my delegation shall distribute a document which describes in greater detail my Government's positions on the major subjects discussed by this Committee. My oral statement will therefore be limited to the following comments.

Although international cooperation in the field has made significant progress over the past few years, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a cause for serious concern. Adherence to existing treaties is not universal and some contracting parties have not been reluctant to interpret their commitments as they see fit. My country, which has renounced all weapons of mass destruction, is determined to comply scrupulously with its obligations not to contribute in any way to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to take all necessary measures to that end.

Next year will be decisive for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Switzerland fully supports the objectives of non-proliferation, but we also hope that effective measures will continue to be taken towards nuclear disarmament with a view to making progress towards the ultimate objective of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty is of such importance for international security that no effort must be spared to ensure its long-term extension by consensus.

Regarding the biological weapons Convention, Switzerland has regretted from the outset the absence of verification machinery. We are therefore pleased that the Special Conference of States Parties held in Geneva from 19 to 30 September was eventually able to mandate an ad hoc Group to fill that gap.

Switzerland has always supported balanced, non-discriminatory and verifiable treaties. One agreement which we consider to be an outstanding example in that regard is the Convention on chemical weapons. It is my pleasure to announce that the Swiss Federal Assembly on

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27 September 1994, ratified that Convention and adopted the legislative measures necessary for its implementation in our country.

For Switzerland, the strengthening of transparency measures in the area of conventional weapons is extremely important. It would be regrettable to lose the impetus that led to the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, my delegation took a stand in favour of supplementing the Register by the inclusion of information on military stocks and troops. We sincerely hope that certain qualms will soon be overcome and that we will be able to begin our work in a constructive spirit.

The 1981 inhumane weapons Convention is of particular importance to my country. On nearly every continent, entire regions have been doomed by the massive and indiscriminate dispersal of mines. The human costs of this scourge are horrendous. There is a need to review the 1981 Convention in order to make it both more effective and more attractive. The Swiss Federal Council decided on 11 May to implement a moratorium on the sale of land-mines to those States which have not ratified Protocol II. Switzerland hopes that other States will soon join those which have already adopted such a measure.

My country is aware, however, that moratoriums alone are insufficient. Switzerland has therefore proposed to the Expert Group mandated to prepare the review Conference the complete ban on the manufacture, stockpiling, import, export and use of non-detectable and anti-personnel mines that are not provided with a self-destruction or neutralization mechanism or process.

We are also aware of the unacceptable damage caused by new types of weapons and ammunition, and we support efforts aimed at controlling their use. My country has, *inter alia*, proposed that a new protocol be drafted concerning small-calibre arms and ammunition. I must admit that the deliberations within the Expert Group have yet to satisfy us fully. We hope that, at the next meeting of the Group, it will be possible to achieve more substantive results.

I shall conclude my comments by noting that the political impetus shown in the First Committee is having an ever greater effect on specific negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. This gives grounds for great satisfaction and we hope that this constructive spirit can be maintained in the interests of progress. For that same reason I must however, once again, express my Government's regret that the Conference on Disarmament still has not succeeded in settling the question of the expansion of its membership and I hope that it will be able to do so in the very near future.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of Switzerland for the document he will be circulating in the Committee. I am certain that the Committee will read it very attentively.

Mr. Holum (United States of America): In keeping with the reforms recently introduced, I will give a shorter oral version of my statement in contrast to the longer text that has been distributed.

The United States congratulates you, Sir, on your election and pledges its cooperation in the important work that lies ahead.

Congratulations are also due to the United Nations itself on its success in clearing away much of the divisive ideological and political underbrush that occupied so much time, to so little effect, during the era of maximum East-West and North-South confrontation. By focusing on more substantive international problems, the United Nations is earning the world's confidence and growing trust. So when we celebrate the United Nations fiftieth anniversary next year, we will be celebrating a maturation of international statesmanship as well.

A testament to that transition would be prompt, favourable action on the United States initiative on anti-personnel landmines, as highlighted by President Clinton in his address to the General Assembly three weeks ago.

It has become customary for those in my position to conduct a *tour d'horizon* of arms control efforts from the United States perspective. But today I will break with that custom to address a single issue of surpassing importance: the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons.

The world community should have no higher arms control priority in the months to come than the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. The decision awaiting us next April is the most historic decision that most of us will ever face.

The entry of the Treaty into force in 1970 transformed the action of becoming a nuclear-weapon State from one of

national pride to a violation of international law and the law still prevails.

During the 1960s, when the non-proliferation Treaty was negotiated, many predicted that there would be 20 or 30 avowed nuclear-weapon States today. Reputable estimates place the number of States now having the required technical and economic resources at over 40. But there are still only five nuclear-weapon States — the same as when the non-proliferation Treaty was brought into force — and three other "threshold" States.

The non-proliferation Treaty system has broadened tangibly in recent years; with the accessions of China, France, South Africa, the Baltics and nearly all of the newly independent States, including Belarus and Kazakhstan; the announced intentions of Argentina and Algeria; and the non-nuclear decisions of Chile and Brazil. With nearly 170 parties now, the non-proliferation Treaty enjoys the widest adherence of any arms-control agreement in history.

Because it has global reach, the non-proliferation Treaty sets the fundamental legal standard and political framework for all the cases of greatest concern to the international community. But the true value of the non-proliferation Treaty is reflected in the group of States that is almost entirely ignored in discussions on the non-proliferation Treaty, namely all the others — all the others — all the States for which nuclear arms are not an issue, because they have made and kept nuclear non-proliferation commitments. The greatest achievements of the non-proliferation Treaty are invisible, consisting of bad things not happening, nuclear material not diverted, weapons not made.

Without the non-proliferation Treaty, one must assume that over time many of those bad things would begin to happen — and dozens of States could seek to hedge their nuclear bets against an uncertain future.

Let me address the principal arguments against indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Some complain that the Treaty is "discriminatory" because it accepts five nuclear Powers and freezes out all others, but the Treaty did not create nuclear-weapon "haves" and "have-nots". It only reflected that inherited reality — and helped stop a deadly trend in its tracks — while at the same time committing all parties, including the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The measure of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements lies not in their egalitarianism, but in their contributions to international security.

The fact is, if the world were to insist today on a reflexive nuclear equality, the likely result would be a levelling up, not a levelling down; not a world freed of nuclear weapons, but a world filled with nuclear-weapon States.

Another argument one hears is that indefinite extension would legitimate nuclear weapons for all time. In fact, the opposite is true. In recent years, with the non-proliferation Treaty in place, the United States and the former Soviet Union have eliminated over 2,500 intermediate-range missiles, taking an entire class of weapons out of commission; decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands more tactical nuclear arms; and agreed in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) and the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) to take more than 17,000 nuclear weapons off missiles and bombers.

The call in the non-proliferation Treaty for an end to the arms race has been met. The race now is to bring down force levels as quickly, safely and securely as possible.

The Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review has recently confirmed that nuclear weapons now play a smaller role in United States security strategy than ever. Since 1988 we have reduced our total active stockpile by 59 per cent; our strategic warheads by 47 per cent; and our non-strategic nuclear-force warheads by a remarkable 90 per cent. The United States is at present dismantling around 2000 nuclear weapons a year, the highest rate that technical limitations will permit.

During last month's summit in Washington, President Clinton and President Yeltsin instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue on the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of nuclear forces. They also agreed, once START II was ratified, immediately to unload all affected nuclear warheads, instead of waiting until the controlled bombers and missiles were taken down.

So the world can see its two leading nuclear Powers move from limiting delivery vehicles and weapons systems towards openly and irreversibly eliminating nuclear warheads. As President Clinton affirmed recently in his joint communiqué with Indian Prime Minister Rao, we envisage, ultimately, a world free of such arms.

Now the ledger in fulfilment of article VI includes two additional multilateral efforts — to conclude the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty already under way and to negotiate a world-wide fissile material cut-off treaty.

Concluding the comprehensive test-ban treaty is an imperative for the United States, a fact underscored on two occasions this year when I delivered personal messages from President Clinton to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The President's first message said that of all the items on the agenda of the Conference, "none is more important" than negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty "at the earliest possible time". The second stressed that "earliest possible time" means exactly what it says. We are doing everything in our power to make the first half-century of nuclear explosions the last. Indeed, as shown by our moratorium on testing while the negotiations proceed, we are prepared for the conclusion that the United States has already conducted its last nuclear-weapons test.

A cut-off treaty would cap the amount of material available for nuclear explosives. It could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of certain States not parties to the NPT under some measure of international restraint for the first time. We urge all States represented here to reaffirm last year's consensus, and we urge adoption of a simple negotiating mandate in the Conference on Disarmament.

I began working on arms control issues in the late 1960s as an aide to Senator George McGovern. Now I have the mission of advocating arms control within the United States Government, and negotiating it with other Governments. The NPT inspires this work, to be sure, through article VI. But more important, the NPT makes these efforts possible by giving the United States, as well as other countries, a clear view of a secure world, in which these arms can safely be laid down.

It is a fact that if the future of the NPT is jeopardized, the prospects for future arms control will diminish; if the future of the NPT is secured, the steep trend in reductions can continue. Indefinite extension of the NPT will bring us closer to the day when nuclear weapons will be banished for ever; anything less will put that day off. Simply put, further progress in arms control depends on a permanent NPT.

Well, it is argued, why not hold up the NPT — or just extend it for a short time — as a way to force even greater progress on the nuclear-weapon States? Some, for example, suggest that we should hold the extension of the NPT hostage to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and then make it permanent. But those who think the NPT is a bargaining chip ignore a cardinal rule: do not gamble with something you cannot afford to lose.

For reasons that include geography, the States most immediately put at risk by nuclear proliferaters are their immediate and regional neighbours — not the United States. We support the NPT in our own interests, to be sure, but we do so even more strongly in the interests of those States located in regions of tension.

The NPT gives all member countries the security of knowing that their neighbours and regional rivals will not be able effectively to pursue nuclear-weapons ambitions — not only because they have agreed not to, but also because there is a global system for verifying that they have not done so.

For all those whose votes will decide its fate, the NPT is a source, not of leverage, but of security. It has the same true value for every country: not as a lever for moving the nuclear-weapon States, but as a shield to ward off the dangers and costs of regional arms races.

The related proposition that indefinite extension can be put off is particularly dangerous because it is so seductively plausible — and so wrong. The Treaty spells out three, and only three, extension options: indefinite extension, extension for a fixed period, or extension for fixed periods. Any but the first risks crippling the Treaty — either by involving the legal uncertainty of a series of piecemeal extensions, or by requiring the practical impossibility of immediate or eventual amendment. Those who invent scenarios to avoid this basic truth have failed to carry their burden of proving that permanent extension can be deferred without the grave risk that it will be denied.

Another frequent criticism of the NPT is that certain States have not joined. Let there be no doubt: the United States strongly favours universal adherence, but enlarging the prospect that the NPT may lapse at some point makes it less likely — not more likely — that States such as Israel, India and Pakistan will ultimately join. The best chance for their ultimate adherence lies in a strong Treaty that is a permanent part of the international security system.

The real question is not whether the NPT can solve every problem by itself, but whether the world is better off with it than without it. No one can predict definitively the nature of a world without the NPT, but each of us must

think concretely about the massive proliferation pressures that could be tragically unleashed if the Treaty ever expires.

The Japanese have a saying: "The nail that stands out will be hammered down." All States have felt the hammering force of the NPT against nuclear proliferation, but in a world without the Treaty, States might avoid standing out, not by resisting pressures to have nuclear weapons, but by succumbing to them.

In June 1946, when the United Nations and the nuclear age were both in their infancy, Bernard Baruch addressed the United Nations with the portentous words, "We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead." The road then taken led to a nuclear arms race that lasted for almost five decades.

In the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union scaled the nuclear heights — in the process expending staggering resources and talent, risking human health and the environment, and making the perils of nuclear catastrophe a daily companion. Now, at last, we are climbing down from the precipice. And we implore Member States — with urgency and from our own experience: do not start up that mountain. Its crevasses are treacherous; avalanches are a constant risk; the trip will drain your time and your treasury. The two States that have spent the most time at the highest altitudes are returning to Earth with alacrity and relief.

The Clinton Administration is committed to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. We will achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty — the only question is "When?" — and "sooner" is a much better answer than "later": 1995 is our only realistic chance to make the NPT permanent. Now especially, with super-Power arsenals falling and the prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty rising — with the largest nuclear-weapon Powers finally able to de-emphasize nuclear weapons in their defence planning — now, I say, is not the time to abandon the agreement that enables us to turn the arms race around.

The decision we face today is as fundamental as that of 1946. But to choose wisely between the living and the dead, we must be wideawake. We need to elevate extension of the NPT to the higher plane where it belongs — above the din of international politics as usual, above the jockeying and horse-trading. History will not treat us kindly if we miscalculate with our children's security.

We must acknowledge that, just six months from now, we will be taking, together, the most fateful single vote affecting world peace in the remainder of this century and for years to come.

If our seriousness of purpose reflects the true stakes, I know we will do the right thing — and safeguard this indispensable agreement for all nations, for all people, for all time.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the document he is making available to the Committee. The Committee will examine it very carefully.

Mr. Tanaka (Japan): Let me first, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, extend to you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-ninth session. You may be assured of my delegation's full cooperation as you strive to guide the work of the First Committee to a successful conclusion.

I have just learned that the negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the nuclear issue ended in agreement last night and were concluded on an *ad interim* basis. Japan genuinely welcomes that agreement as providing the foundation for the solution of the issue based on dialogue and consultations.

The maintenance of international peace and security is the primary area of concern to the United Nations. As Japan's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yohei Kono, affirmed in his address in the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September, in that area of endeavour Japan places great emphasis on disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan, the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, strictly observes the three principles of not producing, not possessing and not allowing into its territory nuclear weapons of any kind. It is steadfastly committed to the ultimate goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons. At the same time, Japan supports the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for an indefinite period and calls on all States that have not yet acceded to that Treaty to do so at the earliest opportunity.

In the report on the nuclear-posture review, recently released by the Department of Defense, the United States indicated that once START II had been ratified, and if the

present favourable trend in its relations with the newly independent States that were formerly part of the Soviet Union continued, it would work for further reductions in its strategic nuclear arms. Speaking before the General Assembly on 26 September, President Clinton declared that the United States and the Russian Federation were

> "working on agreements to halt production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives; to make dismantling of nuclear warheads transparent and irreversible; and further to reduce [their] nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 4th meeting, p. 8)*

In his address to the General Assembly on that same day, President Yeltsin stated that

> "we should...give thought to further steps to limit Russian and American strategic nuclear weapons." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th meeting, p. 3)*

We heartily welcome those statements as indications that the trend towards further nuclear disarmament remains strong.

With respect to the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear- test-ban treaty, which are under way in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, a rolling text has already been formulated and negotiations will resume immediately after the First Committee concludes its work. Japan hopes that substantial progress will be made on technical issues by the end of this year and that, building on such progress, full-fledged negotiations on key political issues will be largely completed early in the session of the Conference on Disarmament next year so that before the extension Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty is convened we may be confident that a comprehensive test-ban treaty will be concluded. As Foreign Minister Kono proposed in his statement in the General Assembly, once the negotiations on the treaty are concluded, a ceremony for its signing by heads of State or Government might be held in Japan — for example, in the city of Hiroshima. The occasion could be viewed as a new starting-point for efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all.

Japan attaches great importance to the prohibition of the production of fissile material for explosive purposes, the so-called "cut-off". Indeed, Japan considers the cut-off to be a global nuclear-disarmament measure of no less importance than the comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are therefore encouraged that agreement in principle was achieved to begin negotiations on this important undertaking in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan hopes that Ambassador Shannon of Canada, in his capacity as Special Coordinator on the cut-off, will succeed in reaching agreement on the negotiating mandate and that the negotiations will in fact begin without delay.

The stability of the international community requires that appropriate security assurances be given to non-nuclear-weapon States. Japan therefore welcomes the fact that nuclear-weapon States are seriously considering this matter, and it hopes that their efforts will result in concrete measures.

As I have noted, numerous significant initiatives have been taken in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, creating a more favourable political environment for the non-proliferation Treaty extension Conference scheduled for April 1995. Various issues relating to extension of the Treaty were seriously discussed, and progress was made at the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 1995 Treaty Conference held at Geneva in mid-September. It is disappointing, however, that complete agreement has not been reached on, for example, the organizational matters of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee. Japan would like to call upon Ambassador Ayewah, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee at its third session, to conduct further intensive consultations on the pending organizational issues so that the procedures will be in place to ensure that the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty is effected smoothly.

I find it profoundly regrettable that, on 7 October, China once again conducted a nuclear test. China's action is particularly discouraging at this time, when the moratorium on nuclear testing is being observed by other nuclear-weapon States as part of their nuclear-non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and when all non-nuclear-weapon States are also making serious efforts to achieve that goal. Nuclear testing at this time flies in the face of these international efforts, and Japan calls upon China to desist from conducting further tests.

During the latter half of last month a special conference was held on biological weapons, which are a category of weapons of mass destruction. Japan welcomes the agreement reached at the conference to establish an ad hoc group to ensure compliance with the biological weapons convention and to prepare for the formulation of a legally binding instrument. Furthermore, Japan hopes that the chemical weapons Convention will enter into force as

quickly as possible, and is working vigorously for its ratification.

We welcome the progress that is being made through these international efforts in the elimination and non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction.

We continue to witness the suffering caused by conventional weapons in conflicts in various parts of the world. The unregulated transfer and excessive accumulation of conventional weapons destabilize the regions concerned and intensify the destructiveness of civil wars. For its part, Japan adheres strictly to its policy of not exporting weapons. As Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yanagisawa argued in his address to the Conference on Disarmament on 1 September, Japan considers it essential to world peace and stability that the leading arms-producing countries should limit their exports of weapons in order not to aggravate regional instability. Furthermore, the question of anti-personnel land-mines should be seriously addressed, both as a disarmament problem and as a humanitarian issue. Japan intends to participate actively in the work of reviewing the Convention on conventional weapons in order to tighten the controls on the use and availability of land-mines.

The promotion of measures for transparency in armaments is also an extremely important aspect of arms control and disarmament in the area of conventional weapons. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was established in 1992 at the initiative of Japan and European countries, had gained the participation of 82 countries by 29 September of this year. I find it especially gratifying that several important countries in the Asia-Pacific region have joined the ranks of participants this year. Japan trusts that the discussions conducted in the Conference on Disarmament and by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, as well as in such regional forums as those of the Association of South-East Asian States (ASEAN), will prove useful in strengthening and expanding the Register. We therefore hope that the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts will meet again, in 1996 at the latest, to consider further expansion of the Register.

Japan has endeavoured to promote international understanding on transparency in armaments, for example by co-hosting seminars with the United Nations. Moreover, I believe the United Nations regional disarmament centres will have a greater role to play in enhancing the transparency of conventional weapons and promoting arms control on a regional basis. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, in particular, has been very active in implementing various programmes. Japan hopes that the United Nations Secretariat will take positive measures, including measures in the fields of financing and personnel, further to enhance the activities of the United Nations regional disarmament centres. Continuing the annual practice that it inaugurated in 1989, Japan hosted a United Nations disarmament conference in Hiroshima this year and intends to host another in Nagasaki in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

Next year, which also marks the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), various disarmament-related meetings will be held. The review and extension Conference on the NPT is but one important example. In this post-cold war era when efforts are being made to create a new world order based on dialogue and cooperation, Japan is determined to play a positive role in achieving further progress in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It is both strengthened and encouraged in its endeavours by the knowledge that international public support for disarmament is gaining momentum, steadily and surely.

Mr. Guillén (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I take pleasure in congratulating you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. My congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee. I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor. My delegation is very confident that your experience and the cooperation of all delegations will ensure that the work that has started here will reach the objectives we all eagerly desire for each of the items now before us for consideration.

Since 1987, world military expenditures have continued steadily to decline. This is a heartening trend. However, initial reductions are generally the easiest to put into effect, and it is clear that much still remains to be done. These changes reflect, at the same time, progress in the execution of structural adjustment programmes in developing countries and in the States of Eastern Europe, along with continued and widespread budgetary pressures. It is estimated that reductions to date amount to approximately $935 billion, and forecasts for the next five years indicate an additional amount of $460 billion.

Beset as they are domestically by a large number of complex social and economic problems related to development, the developing countries have an even greater

need for disarmament. Although certain regions have made less progress than others in this context, the overall picture is very encouraging, especially in contrast to the excessive expenditures of the past. However, despite the significant progress that has been achieved, there are still no very visible signs of links between disarmament and development. On the other hand, the link between the arms race mentality and under-development is more evident at this stage.

In our opinion, the priority issue in this area should be effective international regulation of the arms trade. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is a positive step in this direction, but it could be improved by inclusion of information on existing stocks, local production and local arms procurement. The Register could also incorporate certain other significant categories of weapons so as properly to reflect the specific security interests of each region.

In this context, we cannot overlook the fact that the permanent members of the Security Council are continuing to supply the highest proportion of the conventional weapons exported to the developing countries. At the same time, they are continuing to develop military programmes dating back to the 1970s and 1980s. This is to some extent a reflection of the influential role of military establishments, which resist change. Furthermore, the conversion of the military industry is proving to be a more complex and costly process than was initially thought.

We recognize the decisive importance of regional conventional disarmament for world peace and stability and in terms of supporting current efforts to promote development and economic restructuring. The removal of one source of antagonism has uncovered many others. Disarmament has not taken place automatically since the end of the cold war, thus disappointing our high and premature expectations. Rather, excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons is breeding regional instability. It is urgent and also now politically possible that disarmament negotiations should become genuinely multilateral in nature and that the developing countries should be effectively incorporated into the disarmament process and the building of new regional security systems. The regional organizations should become involved themselves in this process, strengthening their cooperation with the United Nations. Furthermore, the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace, Disarmament and Development should also play a constructive role in this regard. This requires them to refocus their principal activities and take on the task of promoting new security agreements in accordance with the needs outlined in the "An Agenda for Peace". These Centres should also envisage new structures for regional security and indicate specific priorities for disarmament on the regional level, thus paving the way for integration of the "Agenda for Peace" and the "Agenda for Development".

The now reduced but still persistent danger of nuclear disaster underscores the practical value of a central mechanism for coping with proliferation. That mechanism is the Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For this reason, we believe that at the time of the crucial decision on its indefinite extension, beginning in 1995, there should also be progress on important issues related to this matter. I am thinking of reductions in and final destruction of existing nuclear weapons, the banning of all tests and of the production of fissile material, and effective security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Progress in these areas has been encouraging, but limited and uneven. However, eventual multilateral agreements on these points seem, now more than ever, to be within reach. The non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is an issue of great importance that will require renewed political resolve and will.

We believe that the nuclear Powers should refrain from carrying out nuclear tests for the duration of these negotiations, and that they should also include in existing bilateral agreements measures providing for the destruction of the nuclear weapons they are eliminating from their arsenals.

In this context, I wish to inform the Committee that, together with the provisional technical secretariat of the Preparatory Committee for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, of the Hague, the Government of Peru organized the second regional seminar for Latin America and the Caribbean on the national application of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which was held in Lima from 1 to 3 September of this year.

The United Nations peace operations are in need of urgent reform. The increasing proliferation of conflicts within national borders seems to be the most characteristic trait of current concerns about peace and security. Often, longstanding social and economic imbalances underlie ethnic, religious and intercommunal conflicts. Neither traditional peace-keeping operations nor major military operations seem to be the appropriate response, given the nature of the current widespread demand throughout the world for United Nations peace-keeping operations. This suggests the need to establish a special mechanism, which

might take the form of a lightly armed United Nations police force. The non-military nature of such a force would also make it easier to gain the consent of the parties and could, possibly, facilitate progress in other complex issues generally associated with peace-keeping operations, such as unity of command, the decision-making process, the desirability of activating the United Nations Military Staff Committee, and so on. This mechanism might also encourage Member States to contribute national police personnel, thus making it possible to broaden support for prudently undertaken and properly conducted peace-keeping operations.

Lastly, together with the questions to which I have already referred, at this session of the First Committee we also attach top priority to assistance in mine clearance and the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines. We hope that in this way it will be possible to make progress in the immediate implementation of resolutions 48/7 and 48/75, which were adopted last year on these two items, respectively.

Mr. Westdal (Canada): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of our Committee. Your years of diplomatic and academic experience will be valuable in our deliberations and in the fulfilment of your demanding responsibilities. You can count on my personal support and on that of my delegation.

The time for action has now come. My statement today and the bearing and conduct of the Canadian delegation throughout our work will reflect this conviction.

We do not need more statements of intent; we need the political will to take decisions that will move the arms control and disarmament agenda forward at a pace and in a direction that the exigencies of the next century demand and that our people expect. We have not yet fully exploited the new opportunities for progress. We must act now or lose the momentum that has been so painstakingly developed over the last decades.

We are on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. Canada is deeply committed to strengthening the United Nations in all its aspects. The work that we carry out here in the First Committee must become an integral part of that strengthening process.

As the Security Council affirmed at its summit meeting in 1992, and as the Secretary-General repeated yesterday here, non-proliferation is vital to international security. Arms control and disarmament are essential elements in preventive diplomacy. The processes of arms control and disarmament build confidence. They are designed to bring transparency, dialogue and consultation to fields and to issues where secrecy usually reigns — not simply between Governments, but often within them.

Further, the techniques and mechanisms that have become part of effective verification regimes in multilateral arms control and disarmament arrangements are precisely the tools of conflict prevention: early warning, fact-finding, objective assessment of information, on-site inspection, and consultative mechanisms for raising and resolving questions or discrepancies. Arms-control experience has expanded the inventory of instruments available for use in diplomatic efforts. Many of these techniques were controversial and innovative. They broke new ground.

We must, here, break new ground. We must also consolidate the substantial gains we have made in arms control and disarmament, and ensure that we do not, through posturing, impede real progress. We expect progress on all the key issues on our agenda because we believe that progress is possible.

First, we have a responsibility here to ensure that the ground is effectively prepared for a successful review and for the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That Treaty is the mainstay of the non-proliferation system. It has worked. The NPT has enshrined a framework of values and principles that has prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitated the development of peaceful nuclear programmes and the transfer of materials and technologies for peaceful uses. The Treaty binds us to the long-term goal of general and complete disarmament. It is truly an extraordinary Treaty, one which Canada wants to see preserved indefinitely. It is also a Treaty that warrants universal adherence. We call on those who have not signed the Treaty to do so.

Second, we must provide impetus to the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a treaty to end all nuclear tests, in all environments, and for all time. A few years ago a comprehensive ban was only a dream: now, it is almost a reality. Negotiations are going well, but we want to pick up the pace. There is no reason to delay and every reason to move forward with deliberate speed. Intersessional work serves the goal I believe we all share — the earliest possible conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Third, a prohibition on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes is within our grasp. The First Committee should unite to affirm that all nations gathered here are committed to cutting off the production of fissile material for weapons. Last year, Canada sponsored a resolution in this Committee — one which was adopted by consensus — and, as a result, our Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Gerald Shannon, was named Special Coordinator entrusted with the task of identifying a negotiating mandate.

We have made some progress: agreement has been reached that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for negotiations and, in principle, that an ad hoc committee should be established. However, agreement on a negotiating mandate is proving elusive. Canada urges a pragmatic, constructive approach. It is surely within the negotiations themselves that the difficult issues of substance should be addressed. They cannot be resolved in the mandate. Negotiations must begin — and why not on the basis of the consensus we expressed last year? We should send the Conference on Disarmament — and more important, the world — a clear signal that the production of fissile material for weapons purposes must cease.

Fourth, we must halt the indiscriminate use and the abuse of anti-personnel land-mines. There are as many as 100 million land-mines still uncleared in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Central America and other States scarred by war. The wounds cannot heal when land-mines claim scores of victims a week, long after the fighting has stopped.

The most effective instrument at our disposal is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, and our chance to strengthen it at next year's review conference. Canada seeks to expand the Convention to include internal conflicts among the areas covered in Protocol II. We want also to develop mechanisms for effective verification. The humanitarian dimension of this issue is clear and compelling. Our debate here must set the stage for real progress in strengthening the Convention.

Fifth, let us not lose sight of the importance of the achievement last year, after decades of negotiation, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Canada will join in sponsoring a clear, concise draft resolution with a straightforward message: that the world will be a better place once there is universal accession to the chemical weapons Convention and once those weapons disappear from inventories and doctrines. We will look for the support of all delegations in building consensus on that draft resolution.

Sixth, we made real progress last month at the special conference of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, securing a mandate to prepare a legally binding instrument to promote and demonstrate compliance. Canada is strongly committed to this effort. Biological weapons have no place in the world. We want the First Committee to lend impetus to this process so that a draft legal instrument will be ready to present to the fourth review conference, to be held in 1996.

Seventh, the function of science and technology in the context of international security has long been an issue of special interest to Canada. Among States, there are pronounced differences of view, particularly in respect of the transfer of dual-use technology. For Canada, the solution must recognize the need for States to have access to the technology needed for their development and at the same time must provide assurances that such technology will be used for peaceful purposes only.

Over the past few years, Canada and Brazil have worked hard to achieve a consensus on this vital subject. We came very close at last year's session of the Disarmament Commission. We want to resume that effort. The issue is too important and too rich with potential for progress to be left off our agenda. Canada and Brazil will present a draft resolution to welcome the progress made in the Disarmament Commission, reaffirm the issue's importance and urge continued efforts towards a final consensus.

In his statement to the General Assembly on 29 September, my Foreign Minister emphasized that the task of controlling conventional weapons is the responsibility of every Government. We have established within the United Nations a transparency and confidence-building mechanism to contribute to an environment within which Governments might fulfil that responsibility: the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. We want the Register to grow in scope and strength, and we want the Group of Experts to resume its work to that end. We urge others to join us in providing the Register with data on military holdings and procurement through national production.

We are concerned that there may be a lessening of political will to deal with conventional weapons, their transfers and excessive build-up. Given the conventional wars raging in the world and the huge sums of money being devoted to military spending, we believe that the Register warrants more political interest and practical support.

(*spoke in French*)

Before concluding, I would like to mention the study by the group of experts on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, which was established last year and which was chaired by my predecessor. In Canada's view, verification experience since the conclusion of the first United Nations study on this matter, in 1990, has revealed important new potential for effective United Nations action. We hope that all Member States will come to see this study in the broader context of efforts to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to address international peace and security issues in the post-cold-war world, in response to the challenges presented by the Secretary-General in his "An Agenda for Peace" and "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era".

(*spoke in English*)

In that broader context, we must recognize the vital contributions of regional organizations to international security. Canada is working actively within the Organization of American States, the regional forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and elsewhere to support our global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives.

Our arms control and disarmament priorities and goals have not really changed much over the last 20 years. What has changed is that our goals can now be realized. We must take decisive action now — and here. We should have no tolerance for excuses, inaction or delaying tactics. Indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a cut-off convention, strengthened chemical weapons and biological weapons regimes, and other achievements are all within our grasp. We can catalyze action. With that goal, my delegation looks forward to working with other delegations and with you, Mr. Chairman, over the coming weeks.

Mr. Ponce (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The new expectations and growing demands faced by the United Nations since the end of the cold war have brought about an expansion of the Organization's work in the area of international peace and security, as reflected in the heightened activity of the Security Council. Because of the uncertainties resulting from new sources of conflict among States and from the proliferation of international action on situations within States, we should adapt the Organization in order to cope with these new challenges.

The destabilizing effects of adverse economic situations and their attendant social tensions fuel nationalist and religious intolerance and xenophobia and lead to the kindling or rekindling of complex disputes. Hence, the General Assembly's debate on "An Agenda for Peace" has been followed by discussion of an agenda for development, recognizing that international action should address both domains simultaneously as the only way to achieve international peace and security.

The Organization should contribute by instituting effective measures to meet basic human needs and putting in place a range of effective procedures for the settlement of disputes reaffirming the system of collective security. The extent of our success in negotiations to attain those objectives on clear, universal legal foundations will determine the advantage we can derive from the unique opportunity offered by the end of confrontation between ideological blocs.

There have been positive developments in the field of disarmament and arms control. In the sphere of nuclear disarmament, and as an important contribution towards the final goal of the complete elimination of such weapons, Ecuador hails the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The speedy conclusion of such a treaty, along with success in negotiations on banning fissile materials and the granting of positive guarantees to non-nuclear States — significant steps in themselves — would help create a favourable climate for the work of the 1995 review and extension conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has proven to be a particularly relevant instrument in controlling the dissemination of such weapons. The delegation of Ecuador considers that at the 1995 Conference measures should be agreed on to improve it so that it can enjoy universal validity for all time. In order to prevent indefinite extension from being used,

paradoxically, to retard progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, in addition to the importance of negotiations on tests, fissile materials and guarantees that I referred to earlier, it is important, pursuant to article VI of the Treaty, for the nuclear Powers to agree on specific programmes for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons.

The Government of Ecuador warmly welcomed the decisions announced by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile and Saint Lucia to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Ecuador is pleased to see the long-term endeavour in our region to promote disarmament and international peace and security culminate in the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone.

My Government has sent the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction to our Congress for ratification, and we attach the highest priority to its early entry into force, not only because of the harmful effects of such weapons but also because of the value of that Treaty in the process of eliminating weapons of mass destruction with a universal verification mechanism.

We hail the progress made in the Conference on Disarmament on a number of its agenda items, although we wish to voice our discouragement at the lack of agreement on the question of its possible expansion. We believe that the urgent and important tasks entrusted to the Conference would be properly addressed if it were made more representative by means of a geographically equitable expansion of its membership, consonant with the growth of our Organization. In this regard, Ecuador considers that new members must not be incorporated on the basis of selective criteria of dubious transparency, and for this reason we support the idea put forward yesterday by the spokesperson of the European Union:

> "...the most practical solution would be for all countries which have applied to date to be accepted without delay." (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, First Committee, 3rd meeting, p. 12*)

The Disarmament Commission was once again affected at its last session by the misuse of consensus, which, becoming a new form of veto, prevented the substantial progress made on the item "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" from being reflected in the report. My delegation trusts that this Committee will again take up the valuable result of those efforts to promote the adoption of international guidelines in this area, which is the only way to meet the demands of the right to development while at the same time preserving international peace and security and preventing transfers of technology with military applications from being controlled by selective practices that have not been negotiated on a world-wide basis.

The work done by mandate of this Committee in connection with the item "Relationship between disarmament and development" takes on particular relevance now, during the months when the "Agenda for Development" is being elaborated. The matter of the peace dividend has been part of the discussions on that "Agenda", the development and implementation of which offer opportunities for the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to make new contributions, which my delegation supports.

Although the agenda item "Assistance in mine clearance" has been allocated to plenary meetings, I would like to voice my Government's support for the establishment of a fund to finance cooperative activities to solve the tragic problems caused by the more than 100 million mines scattered around the world. My Government supports the initiative taken by the Andean countries, introduced by Bolivia in document A/49/357/Add.1, for that fund to be financed by resources provided by mine exporters and voluntary contributions so that at least a small portion of the resources derived from trade in those devices could be recycled into programmes designed to mitigate their disastrous effects.

Mr. Keating (New Zealand): My delegation joins others in offering its congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, on your election.

We are meeting today in the middle of one of the most challenging periods in international relations. The end of the cold war has led to an increase in trust and confidence between the major Powers. This has freed up the disarmament negotiating atmosphere, with the result that the world community is now moving ahead on a range of issues, some of them long overdue for action. But on a wider level there has been a tragic surge in conflict and insecurity at the regional level, and that underlines how far we still have to go, especially in the area of conventional weapons.

Let us focus first on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT has made a singular contribution to the world's security. It is not perfect, but there is no other treaty which binds 165 nations to the twin pursuits of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. There is no other treaty which provides an accepted framework for security in the nuclear age. It is for this reason that my Government strongly supports the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

Preparations for next year's Conference to review the NPT and to decide on its extension are occupying an increasingly large part of the disarmament agenda. We have the chance to make progress over the next six months on the questions of substance which flow from the Treaty. If we take the opportunities available to us, we will ensure the best possible environment for the decision we have to take on the future of the Treaty.

The recent announcement by President Clinton and President Yeltsin of an accelerated timetable for the implementation of the START I and START II Treaties is one such opportunity which has been taken. We congratulate them on it. Continued progress by all nuclear-weapons States towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament is an obligation which each assumed on becoming party to the NPT. Steps to this end build confidence and, in so doing, strengthen the non-proliferation norm created by the Treaty.

Secondly, with respect to nuclear testing, we have under way at last a multilateral negotiation to ban all nuclear tests for all time. This is an objective which has long been at the top of New Zealand's disarmament agenda. I want to pay tribute to the Chairman of this negotiation, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and to the participating countries which have made positive contributions to the rolling text.

But now is not the time to rest on the progress that has been made to date. The international community has very high expectations. We consider that this Committee should build on last year's successful resolution by urging — unanimously, we hope — rapid progress on the Conference. We believe that the General Assembly should stand ready to adopt the text as soon as it is completed — before its fiftieth session, we hope.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will be a major milestone on the way to achieving a situation wherein steps towards negotiating the total elimination of nuclear weapons could be contemplated. In the meantime we greatly value the restraint being shown by most of the nuclear-weapon States in respect of nuclear testing. China's continued testing, by contrast, is a matter of concern and disappointment to the New Zealand Government.

While the nettle has been grasped in the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations, other important questions that flow from the NPT — questions such as security assurances and measures to control fissile material for weapons — cannot continue to be deferred.

New Zealand's view is that the nuclear-weapon States must take steps to increase confidence among non-nuclear-weapon States that are committed to the non-proliferation cause. To this end, we favour the negotiation of common security assurances as the basis for a legally binding international instrument. We were particularly pleased to hear the Secretary-General's endorsement of this approach in his statement to the Committee yesterday. This is an issue on which progress can and should be made in the period immediately ahead.

Neither should we delay negotiations to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes — a goal that had unanimous support in the General Assembly last session. We offer our full support to the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament in his continuing efforts to secure agreement on a mandate so that negotiations may begin.

A final point on nuclear weapons must be made. We believe that all NPT parties must play their part if we are to be well prepared for the 1995 Conference. Ensuring compliance with the Treaty is fundamental to its credibility. But in the recent past both Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have, in quite unacceptable terms, challenged the NPT regime and cast a long shadow over security in the Middle East and north-east Asia respectively.

Let us hope that these problems are behind us, because there are more positive developments to record in other parts of the world. Cuba's recent announcement of an intention to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco means that that instrument will soon enter into force for the entire Latin American region. We welcome that, as well as the fact that the African nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty is expected to be adopted in the first half of 1995. When the South Pacific nuclear-free zone and the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty are taken into account, the geographical area in which nuclear weapons are now eschewed is substantial.

In seeking new disarmament and arms-control goals, we should not neglect the need to strengthen and ensure the effective implementation of what we already have. Conventions dealing with weapons of mass destruction must be able to withstand the continuing threat of proliferation. This is as true for the NPT as for the Convention on biological and toxin weapons and our newest negotiating success — the Convention on chemical weapons.

In a special session the Conference of States parties to the Convention on biological and toxin weapons recently agreed to begin in January a process aimed at strengthening its ability to verify the ban on development, production and stockpiling. New Zealand would like to see this process build on the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on verification (VEREX), with the aim of producing a legally binding instrument that could be submitted to the 1996 review Conference.

The ongoing work in The Hague in preparation for the entry into force of the Convention on chemical weapons is of equal significance. Work is currently under way on legislation that would put New Zealand in a position to ratify this Treaty.

Important as these multilateral efforts are, effective action to combat proliferation begins at home. National implementation of non-proliferation commitments must go to our borders and must, we believe, include export-licensing provisions to ensure that commercial trade may continue but without putting at risk the arms-control objectives of the relevant treaties.

Regional perceptions of a threat underlie many of the most complex and tenacious problems on the disarmament and arms-control agenda. In the context of the NPT and even of the Convention on biological and toxin weapons, continuing mutual suspicion remains one of the reasons for the fact that these Treaties have yet to achieve universal adherence. We cannot avoid addressing these realities.

In this context, New Zealand is pleased to be involved in some of the first efforts in the Asia-Pacific region to take stock, on a region-wide basis, of the new realities of its security situation and to plan for the future. In July this year the Regional Forum of the Association of South East Asian Nations met for the first time. The meeting took place in Bangkok. The gathering was a unique occasion. Eighteen Asia-Pacific countries met for the first time in an official capacity to exchange views on the region's security.

At this point the Forum does not have the capacity to solve regional security concerns, but it can certainly help to build the right conditions for avoiding tension through confidence-building and preventive diplomacy.

I turn now to the question of conventional weapons. Conventional arms differ from weapons of mass destruction in that they have a greater degree of accepted legitimacy. But such "legitimacy" has given rise to the waste of much blood and treasure. A recent World Bank study tells us that 19 million people have died in international and civil wars since 1945 — since the founding of this Organization. The majority of these people were civilians.

The level of conventional arms in most regions of the world is extraordinarily high and, by any rational assessment, far exceeds what is required for legitimate security needs. The levels are such that the stockpiles themselves can constitute a source of tension and insecurity. For this reason confidence-building measures are very important.

Our work in this field has to be practical. It is for this reason that New Zealand, from the start, has given strong support to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This has the potential to diminish threat perceptions through greater transparency surrounding the flow of arms. New Zealand believes that the first priority of the Register must be to consolidate what we have achieved and to secure the widest possible participation. We also support expansion of the Register to include production and stockpiles, as well as transfers. We believe that the differences that exist as to how it should be developed can be resolved through further work by a group of governmental experts and in the Conference on Disarmament.

At its session last year the General Assembly saw a welcome increase in the momentum for tighter controls on anti-personnel land-mines. New Zealand's objective for the review of the inhumane weapons Convention is a tougher regime of controls on the use and transfer of mines, with effective verification and compliance provisions. Moreover, given the frequency with which parties to non-international armed conflict have resorted to the use of mines, it is crucial that the revised Convention extend to such situations. That being said, we also welcome proposals which may be pursued outside the regime of the inhumane weapons Convention for fast-track interim measures. Such steps should of course be consistent with, and complementary to, the Convention, and should avoid duplication.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to the unanimous decision of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session to urge the Conference on Disarmament to reach an early consensus on the expansion of its membership by the start of the 1994 session of the Conference. That did not happen. Nor has any progress been made this year — a fact that was noted in the Conference's own report to the General Assembly.

Faced with this impasse, we believe that the time has come for the General Assembly to step in. The current membership of the Conference was composed to suit a past era, and solutions which meet the disarmament and arms control needs of today's world are essential. A negotiating body such as the Conference should reflect all points of view in its composition. We hope that we can count on the support of the broad membership of the First Committee.

Mr. Yarka (Papua New Guinea): On behalf of my delegation I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this very important Committee. Our congratulations are also extended to the other members of the Bureau. Allow me also to convey, through you, our sincere appreciation and gratitude to Ambassador Adolf von Wagner of Germany, who diligently guided the work of the Committee during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. I wish to assure you of the full support and cooperation of the delegation of Papua New Guinea delegation in the discharge of your important duties.

The end of the cold war considerably reduced global tension and created new opportunities for the United Nations to further enhance and promote positive and constructive development in order to ensure long-term peace and security. However, we believe that it has not yet brought the global peace and security we had hoped for despite some positive developments in various parts of the world. The world seems to be drawn daily into an expanding pattern of regional conflict, ethnic strife and internal violence. As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, we have to reassess our achievements and failures in this important area and emphasize the significance of meeting the challenges that confront us all.

The delegation of Papua New Guinea supports the idea — already put forward on previous occasions — that the work of the First Committee should be rationalized and its agenda reformed. We also believe it is essential that the resolutions adopted by the Committee should evolve towards more binding juridical norms which will effectively strengthen international peace and security.

Papua New Guinea is totally committed to the cause of promoting and maintaining both regional and international peace and stability. We are therefore working very closely with our neighbours, particularly the South Pacific countries and the States members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to collectively put in place arrangements that would further strengthen both regional and global efforts, including all other confidence-building measures.

Papua New Guinea is a signatory to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the purposes and principles of which were endorsed at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly. We believe that international recognition of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation is of great significance because it gives weight to the Treaty as the basis of a peaceful regional order, not just for South-East Asia but for the broader Asia-Pacific region. The Treaty also serves as an example of the way in which regional countries can contribute, in conjunction with the United Nations, towards the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

In the Pacific region also the Governments of the region have collectively put in place a number of arrangements which further strengthen both regional and international efforts to promote and enhance peace and security. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), for instance, is a major achievement in the promotion of regional and international peace and security. This Treaty derived from a need and desire on the part of the countries of the region to protect their environment from any external threat of nuclear armament and war. We wish to reiterate the importance of accession by all nuclear-weapon States to the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga in order to provide meaning and to show leadership and commitment on the part of these States in the achievement of the overall objectives of the disarmament regime.

We also believe that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones would assist in the strengthening of security and could significantly contribute to stability in all parts of the world. In this regard, we welcome Cuba's intention to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the efforts of the African countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the African region.

The recent South Pacific Forum in Brisbane, Australia, among others, reaffirmed its support for the negotiation of a convention to ban the importation into

Forum island countries of hazardous wastes and to control their transboundary movement and management within the South Pacific region, and it welcomed the progress made in that regard. The concept was initiated by Papua New Guinea and it is anticipated that the convention will come into force by 1995. We would welcome the support of the international community, particularly nuclear-weapon States, in promoting such an arrangement.

We welcome the continuing increase in the number of States adhering to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and we hope that the 1995 Review Conference will be able to come up with a feasible compromise that would ensure that the purposes and principles of the NPT and those of the international community are adequately reflected and addressed.

My delegation believes that nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest threats to worldwide peace and security, and that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear arms thus represent one of the most serious challenges, requiring continuous attention and commitment on the part of all States Members of the United Nations. Therefore, strengthening the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system constitutes the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We are pleased to note that with the accession of China and France, all permanent members of the Security Council will have underwritten the NPT, thus helping further to achieve the universality of the Treaty. It is therefore imperative that those States that have not yet acceded to the Treaty should seriously consider doing so.

Papua New Guinea is also of the firm view that the single most important measure yet to be taken in the process of nuclear disarmament is the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We believe this should be the measure of highest priority for the achievement of the global objectives of nuclear disarmament.

My delegation further believes that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is essential in the prevention of the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is now a growing recognition of the need for restraint in the development of new and more powerful nuclear weapons. Furthermore, there is an increasing realization that a cessation of nuclear-weapons testing would contribute to non-proliferation as well as to the achievement of environmental objectives and considerations. My delegation fully supports the current negotiations and we are confident that these negotiations will lead to a successful conclusion.

The maintenance and enhancement of international security require all States to contribute to arms limitation and disarmament measures and to display responsible behaviour in international affairs.

States should demonstrate respect for international peace and security by engaging in appropriate measures of arms control, arms reduction and confidence-building, including respect for international commitments with regard to the agreed measures for nuclear disarmament.

The Papua New Guinea delegation is convinced that one of the requirements in the new political environment is for the leadership of all countries to assume responsibility for seeking the objective of increased international security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces; in particular, those States having the largest nuclear arsenals can contribute to nuclear disarmament.

Finally, in the long term we believe that democracy and development are two importantfactors in redressing dangerous situations in regions and countries where the rule of law is faulty and where huge social and economic imbalances persist. The need for the promotion of a fair and equitable international order would no doubt serve as a catalyst to facilitate lasting peace and security.

The United Nations should therefore play a leading role in ensuring that the objectives of the Charter are achieved, particularly the objectives of lasting peace and security in every part of our global village.

Mr. Blomberg (Finland): Let me first congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this important Committee. I pledge my delegation's full support to you in the exercise of your chairmanship.

Let me begin by saying that Finland supports the positions presented in the statement made by the representative of Germany on behalf of the European Union yesterday in this debate.

With the demise of the cold-war confrontation, the emphasis in today's arms control and disarmament lies increasingly on non-proliferation and on measures conducive to conflict prevention, management and post-conflict healing. Dealing with the excess military capacity accumulated during the cold-war years still present a formidable challenge.

At the same time, the post-cold-war international situation provides a unique opportunity to conclude some long-standing items on the international disarmament agenda, particularly the item concerning a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Finland also looks forward to further nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia in the context of the START process. Sooner or later, all nuclear-weapon States must join the nuclear disarmament process. Naturally, we prefer it to happen sooner rather than later.

Arms-control treaties and the aim of seeking universal adherence to them have gained added significance. So has the need to insist on compliance with existing commitments as well and on effective verification of actual compliance. Continued non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its treaty obligations is a case in point.

International agreements on arms control and disarmament establish norms for responsible behaviour. It is vital for the security of all Member States that the United Nations is there to act in accordance with its Charter if faced with grave violations of multilateral disarmament agreements.

Besides a credible framework of arms-control agreements, cooperative security calls for measures that increase confidence between States and, in the regional context, reduce the risk of conflict by misinformation or miscalculation. Furthermore, cooperative security clearly benefits from increased openness and transparency in military matters, regionally and globally.

A particularly gruesome problem is that of the millions of mines scattered in conflict areas throughout the world. The international community must help de-mine the killing fields. It must also prevent future indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel land-mines. That can best be done by strengthening Protocol II of the inhumane weapons Convention.

In one way or another, these issues are all on the agenda of this Committee. We will comment in more detail, as appropriate, on these and other issues in the context of the relevant thematic discussions.

In 1992, the Security Council unanimously, and at the highest political level, stated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security.

As pointed out by my Foreign Minister, Mr. Haavisto, when he addressed the General Assembly some three weeks ago, the Security Council

> "thus affirmed the fundamental norm first established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) a quarter of a century ago. The almost universal adherence to the NPT demonstrates that the world now shares a common interest in its continued existence." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 4th meeting, p. 19)*

Finland believes, as do many other States parties, that the existence of the NPT must be secured through its indefinite and unconditional extension next year.

The preparatory process of the 1995 NPT Conference is on the home straight. While good progress has been made, key procedural issues remain to be solved. The fourth, and last, session of the Preparatory Committee in January will have to agree on the remaining issues. As in the case of previous sessions, if not more so, the Chairman of the fourth session will need to prepare the ground well, and well in advance.

The NPT Western Group has put forward a representative of my country, Ambassador Patokallio, as its candidate for the chairmanship of the fourth session. He enjoys broad support among the States parties. We look forward to his endorsement by the States parties in the very near future.

Finland welcomes the significant progress made in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty since last January. The negotiations so far have brought out the complexity of the task, in particular regarding the effective verification of the future treaty. But it has also become clear that these complexities can be overcome. Finland is making its contribution to these negotiations through its scientific and technical expertise on both seismic and non-seismic verification.

We look forward to the rapid conclusion of a treaty that will finally put a stop to all nuclear-test explosions in all environments for all time. It is high time indeed.

The existing nuclear-testing moratoriums provide an important backdrop to the negotiations in Geneva. It is therefore with deep regret that my Government has learned that, for the second time this year, China has carried out a nuclear test. We once again urge China to refrain from any

further testing and to join the other nuclear-weapon States in a moratorium.

A treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, the so-called cut-off treaty, would be another breakthrough in nuclear disarmament. We regret that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to agree on a mandate for the cut-off negotiations and thus live up to the expectations endorsed in resolution 48/75 L.

In his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General points out that:

"Despite continued threats to international peace and security in different parts of the world, cooperation on disarmament was not only maintained but significantly enhanced by concerted actions and initiatives of Member States." *(A/49/1, para. 740)*

Finland fully concurs with this assessment. The First Committee of the General Assembly offers all Member States a forum in which to respond to the challenges of the multilateral disarmament and arms control agenda. Finland, for one, is ready to cooperate with all other Member States in meeting that challenge.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.